

# Functors are Type Refinement Systems

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- ▶ group theory is about groups
- ▶ category theory is about categories
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But what on earth are types?

## The intrinsic (“à la Church”) view

Sometimes, a type is like a linguist’s *part of speech*, in the sense that parts of speech (NP, VP, etc.) can be used to distinguish well-formed sentences like

*the quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog*

from non-sentences such as

\* *lazy over dog fox quick the brown jumped the*

Under this usage, every valid program expression carries a type, and “untyped” expressions are considered meaningless.

## The extrinsic (“à la Curry”) view

On the other hand, in natural language sometimes one wants to consider sentences such as

*colourless green ideas sleep furiously*

or

*the king of India in 2014 was bald*

which although syntactically well-formed, fail to satisfy other more semantic criteria of validity. Similarly, in programming sometimes one wants to start with a relatively liberal programming language, but then use types to ensure that programs are in some sense well-behaved.

## Two views of typing

John Reynolds referred to these as the *intrinsic* and the *extrinsic* views of typing in his book, *Theories of Programming Languages*.

(Also known as “types à la Church” and “types à la Curry”.)

## TT through the lens of CT: the standard dogma

A type system induces a category of well-typed terms, e.g., any well-typed term

$$x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \vdash e : B$$

of the simply-typed lambda calculus may be interpreted as a morphism

$$A_1 \times \dots \times A_n \xrightarrow{e} B$$

in a cartesian-closed category [see Lambek and Scott 1986].



## TT through the lens of CT: the standard dogma

The standard dogma favors the **intrinsic** view: any morphism

$$A \xrightarrow{f} B$$

of a category is intrinsically associated with a unique pair of types, namely  $\text{dom}(f) = A$  and  $\text{cod}(f) = B$ .

## A hiccup in the standard dogma

But what about, say, intersection types or subtyping?

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : B \quad \Gamma \vdash e : C}{\Gamma \vdash e : B \cap C} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash e : B \quad B \leq C}{\Gamma \vdash e : C}$$

In a category, it is *ungrammatical* for one morphism to lie between different pairs of objects.

$$* \quad \begin{array}{c} \Gamma \xrightarrow{e} B \\ \Gamma \xrightarrow{e} C \end{array}$$

What Reynolds originally observed is that an intrinsic semantics for such a type system must really interpret **typing derivations** rather than terms. But this leads to questions of coherence<sup>1</sup>...

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<sup>1</sup>Do two derivations of the same typing judgment have the same meaning?

## “The Meaning of Types” (Reynolds 2000)


In later work, Reynolds gave a very elegant proof of coherence for a language with subtyping. The proof begins by defining both an intrinsic semantics and an extrinsic semantics, and then connects them via a logical relations theorem and a “bracketing” theorem (with coherence as a corollary).

Although JCR did not work in the language of category theory (in the 2000 paper), these semantics can be seen as functors

$$\llbracket - \rrbracket_D : \text{Derivations} \rightarrow \text{Meanings}$$
$$\llbracket - \rrbracket_T : \text{Terms} \rightarrow \text{Meanings}$$

## “The Meaning of Types” (Reynolds 2000)

But any “reasonable” type system also induces a functor



and this is also implicit in Reynolds’ analysis (e.g., in the statement of the logical relations theorem and coherence).

## Functors are type refinement systems

Our starting point is the idea that this can actually serve as a working *definition* of “type system” (or *refinement system*).

### Definition

A **(type) refinement system** is a functor  $\mathbf{U} : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$ .


This is a “working” definition in the sense that

1. We have been working with it for a while.
2. It allows one to prove some interesting things about broad classes of type systems.
3. It is open to revision.

# Reading a functor as a refinement system

## Definition


We say that an object  $S \in \mathcal{D}$  **refines**<sup>2</sup> an object  $A \in \mathcal{T}$  if  $U(S) = A$ .



<sup>2</sup>With a tip of the hat to Tim Freeman & Frank Pfenning.

## Definition

A **typing judgment** is a triple  $(S, f, T)$  such that  $S$  and  $T$  refine the domain and codomain of  $f$ , respectively, i.e., such that  $f : A \rightarrow B$ ,  $\mathbf{U}(S) = A$  and  $\mathbf{U}(T) = B$ , for some arbitrary  $A$  and  $B$ . In the special case of a triple with component  $f = \text{id}$ , we also call this a **subtyping judgment**.







## A convention for typing rules

We say that a *typing rule*

$$\frac{S_1 \underset{f_1}{\Longrightarrow} T_1 \quad \cdots \quad S_n \underset{f_n}{\Longrightarrow} T_n}{S \underset{f}{\Longrightarrow} T}$$

is valid (for  $\mathbf{U} : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$ ) if given derivations of the premises, we can construct a derivation of the conclusion...

## Proposition

The following typing rules are valid for any refinement system:

$$\frac{S \xRightarrow{f} T \quad T \xRightarrow{g} U}{S \xRightarrow{f;g} U} ; \quad \frac{}{S \xRightarrow{\text{id}} S} \text{id}$$

## Proposition

Subtyping is reflexive and transitive, and admits rules of covariant and contravariant subsumption:

$$\frac{}{S \leq S} \quad \frac{S \leq T \quad T \leq U}{S \leq U} \quad \frac{S \xRightarrow{f} T \quad T \leq U}{S \xRightarrow{f} U} \quad \frac{S \leq T \quad T \xRightarrow{g} U}{S \xRightarrow{g} U}$$

# Reading Grothendieck in translation

## Definition

A **pullback of  $T$  along  $f$**  is a refinement type  $f^* T$

$$\frac{f : A \rightarrow B \quad T \sqsubseteq B}{f^* T \sqsubseteq A}$$

equipped with a pair of typing rules

$$\frac{}{f^* T \xRightarrow[f]{\quad} T} Lf^* \qquad \frac{S \xRightarrow[g;f]{\quad} T}{S \xRightarrow[g]{\quad} f^* T} Rf^*$$

satisfying equations

$$\frac{\frac{S \xRightarrow[g;f]{\beta} T}{S \xRightarrow[g]{\quad} f^* T} Rf^* \quad \frac{}{f^* T \xRightarrow[f]{\quad} T} Lf^*}{S \xRightarrow[g;f]{\quad} T} ; \quad = \quad S \xRightarrow[g;f]{\beta} T \quad S \xRightarrow[g]{\eta} f^* T = \frac{\frac{S \xRightarrow[g]{\quad} T}{S \xRightarrow[g]{\quad} f^* T} Rf^* \quad \frac{}{f^* T \xRightarrow[f]{\quad} T} Lf^*}{S \xRightarrow[g;f]{\quad} T} ;$$

## Definition

A **pushforward of  $S$  along  $f$**  is a refinement type  $f S$

$$\frac{S \sqsubset A \quad f : A \rightarrow B}{f S \sqsubset B}$$

equipped with a pair of typing rules

$$\frac{S \Longrightarrow T}{f S \Longrightarrow T} \text{ Lf} \quad \frac{}{S \Longrightarrow f S} \text{ Rf}$$

satisfying equations

$$\frac{\frac{S \Longrightarrow f S}{f} \text{ Rf} \quad \frac{\frac{S \xrightarrow{\beta} T}{f;g} \text{ Lf}}{f S \xrightarrow{g} T} \text{ Lf}}{S \xrightarrow{f;g} T} ; \quad = \quad S \xrightarrow{\beta} T \quad f S \xrightarrow{\eta} T \quad = \quad \frac{\frac{S \xrightarrow{f} f S} \text{ Rf} \quad f S \xrightarrow{\eta} T}{f S \xrightarrow{f;g} T} ; \quad \text{Lf}}{S \xrightarrow{f;g} T} ;$$

Fact: a functor  $\mathbf{U} : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$  is a **fibration** iff a pullback  $(f^* T, Lf^*, Rf^*)$  exists for all  $f : A \rightarrow B$  and  $T \sqsubset B$ . It is a **bifibration** iff all pullbacks and pushforwards exist.

Proof: essentially immediate by unwinding definitions.

## Proposition

Whenever the corresponding pullbacks exist:

1. the following subtyping rule is valid:

$$\frac{T_1 \leq T_2}{f^* T_1 \leq f^* T_2}$$

2. we have

$$(g; f)^* T \equiv g^* f^* T \quad \text{id}^* T \equiv T$$



$$\frac{\overline{f^* T_1 \xRightarrow[f]{} T_1} \quad Lf^* \quad T_1 \leq T_2}{\overline{f^* T_1 \xRightarrow[f; \text{id}]{} T_2}} ;$$

$$\frac{\overline{f^* T_1 \xRightarrow[\text{id}; f]{} T_2}}{\overline{f^* T_1 \leq f^* T_2}} \sim Rf^*$$

## **A few examples of refinement systems**

## Example: subsets over sets

Let  $\mathcal{T} = \mathbf{Set}$  be the category of sets and functions, and let  $\mathcal{D} = \mathbf{SubSet}$  be the category whose objects are pairs

$$(A, S \subseteq A)$$

and whose morphisms

$$(A, S) \rightarrow (B, T)$$

are functions  $f : A \rightarrow B$  such that

$$\forall a. a \in S \Rightarrow f(a) \in T$$

Then consider the projection functor  $\mathbf{U} : \mathbf{SubSet} \rightarrow \mathbf{Set}$ .

Observe: pullback = inverse image, pushforward = image

## Example: Hoare Logic

Take  $\mathcal{T}$  as a category with one object  $W$  corresponding to the state space, and with morphisms  $c : W \rightarrow W$  corresponding to commands-as-state-transformers.

Define  $\mathcal{D}$  and  $\mathbf{U} : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$  so that refinements  $\phi \sqsubseteq W$  are state predicates, and a derivation of a typing judgment

$$\phi \xRightarrow{c} \psi$$

corresponds exactly to a verification of a Hoare triple  $\{\phi\}c\{\psi\}$ .

Observations:

- ▶ usual rules of sequential composition, pre-strengthening and post-weakening are valid (see slide 17)
- ▶ pullback = weakest pre, pushforward = strongest post

## Example: STLC à la Curry (after Scott)

Take  $\mathcal{T}$  as a ccc including an object  $U$  and a pair of operations

$$U \begin{array}{c} \xrightarrow{app} \\ \xleftarrow{lam} \end{array} U^U$$

Take  $\mathcal{D}$  as a ccc including a collection of simple types

$$\sigma, \tau, fn[\sigma, \tau], \dots$$

together with morphisms

$$fn[\sigma, \tau] \begin{array}{c} \xrightarrow{App_{\sigma, \tau}} \\ \xleftarrow{Lam_{\sigma, \tau}} \end{array} \tau^\sigma$$

Define  $\mathbf{U} : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$  (as a cartesian closed functor) by

$$\sigma, \tau, \dots \mapsto U \quad App_{\sigma, \tau} \mapsto app \quad Lam_{\sigma, \tau} \mapsto lam$$

## Example: refining a point

Any category determines a trivial refinement system:

$$\begin{array}{c} C \\ \downarrow !c \\ 1 \end{array}$$

**What next?**

In the paper, we describe various ways of taking these basic ideas further, including a bit of discussion of Separation Logic, and culminating in a rational reconstruction of Reynolds' (2000) proof of coherence for a language with subtyping.

In ongoing work, we are exploring how this framework can be applied towards a better understanding of dependent types and effects, as well as the proof theory of linear logic.



We like the slogan that

*functors are type refinement systems*

in part because it works both ways: on the one hand it brings some basic mathematical tools to bear on type theory, but it also suggests a broader scope for type-theoretic reasoning.

Making it more than a slogan will require a lot of work, and we would love some help!

## **Bonus slides**

# Separation Logic

Separating conjunction and magic wand:

$$\phi * \psi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \textcircled{*} (\phi \bullet \psi) \quad \phi - * \tau \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda[\textcircled{*}]^* (\phi \setminus \tau)$$

(but also Day convolution)

Condition equivalent to the Frame Rule:

$$\phi * \mathbf{c}^* \psi \leq \mathbf{c}^* (\phi * \psi)$$

The logical relations theorem:

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \mathcal{D} & \xrightarrow{\rho} & \mathbf{DRel} \\
 \parallel & (0) & \downarrow \partial_0 \\
 \mathcal{D} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket - \rrbracket_D} & \mathbf{Dom}
 \end{array}
 \qquad
 \begin{array}{ccc}
 \mathcal{D} & \xrightarrow{\rho} & \mathbf{DRel} \\
 \mathbf{u} \downarrow & (1) & \downarrow \partial_1 \\
 \mathcal{T} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket - \rrbracket_T} & \mathbf{Dom}
 \end{array}$$

If  $\theta_1 \xrightarrow[\rho]{\alpha} \theta_2$  then  $\vdash \rho[\theta_1] \xrightarrow[\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket, \llbracket \rho \rrbracket]{\implies} \rho[\theta_2]$ .

(case  $\alpha = NI$ )

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\overline{\Delta[\mathbb{N}_\perp]} \Longrightarrow \overline{\Delta[\mathbb{Z}_\perp]} \Delta[i]}{(i,i)}}{(\text{id}, i) \Delta[\mathbb{N}_\perp] \Longrightarrow \Delta[\mathbb{Z}_\perp]} L(\text{id}, i)}{(\text{id}, \Psi_p)^* (\text{id}, i) \Delta[\mathbb{N}_\perp] \Longrightarrow (\text{id}, \Psi_p)^* \Delta[\mathbb{Z}_\perp]} (\text{fun})}{\rho[\text{nat}] \Longrightarrow_{(\llbracket NI \rrbracket, \llbracket \text{id} \rrbracket)} \rho[\text{int}]}$$

(case  $\alpha = Lam$ )

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\overline{\rho[\theta_2]^{\rho[\theta_1]} \Longrightarrow \rho[\theta_2]^{\rho[\theta_1]} \text{id}}}{(\text{id}, \text{id})}}{\rho[\theta_2]^{\rho[\theta_1]} \Longrightarrow \rho[\theta_2]^{\rho[\theta_1]} \sim}}{(\text{id}, (\Phi_f, \Psi_f))} R(\text{id}, \Psi_f)^*}{\rho[\theta_2]^{\rho[\theta_1]} \Longrightarrow (\text{id}, \Psi_f)^* \rho[\theta_2]^{\rho[\theta_1]}}}{\rho[\theta_2^{\theta_1}] \Longrightarrow_{(\llbracket Lam \rrbracket, \llbracket lam \rrbracket)} \rho[\text{fn}[\theta_1, \theta_2]]}$$